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RECENT BOOKS
EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION. By Leonard A. Lecht.
New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 254. $4.50.
The conclusion to be drawn from Mr. Lecht's book is that the railroad
industry generally and its labor relations particularly are a mess. The book
states no such conclusions, however. On the contrary, Mr. Lecht lets the
facts speak for themselves. Indeed, in my opinion he goes too far in this
respect. He operates within no perceptible theoretical or analytical framework. His factual framework, too, is rigorously confined to railway labor
legislation. This may seem an element of strength; at least some may think
such rigor commendable. I should like to suggest, however, that the book
might have been immensely more valuable had its sights been lifted somewhat. Mr. Lecht is one of the few disinterested persons who sees the whole
railroad story in all its sad ramifications. That being the case, he could
have helped a great deal more had he brought to bear on his excellent researches some explicit standard or standards of evaluation and criticism.
The railroad industry is in bad shape. Remedying the situation effectively of course requires knowledge of the facts. But that is not enough. A
genuinely effective remedy can come only with a sound theoretical orientation, an appreciation of the relationships between factors and results. In
human and social affairs, the facts never speak for themselves, any cliche to
the contrary notwithstanding. Usually, when people talk about "facts
speaking for themselves," they are unconsciously supplying a framework of
assumptions, frequently nothing more than prejudice, which supplies a
voice to the mute facts. I am going to try in this review to give Mr. Lecht's
facts a theoretical context.

I
One can readily think of useful theoretical systems within which the
main effort and researches of the book might have been immeasurably more
fruitfully oriented. For instance, one might have approached the railroad
industry as one of the outstanding American experiments in syndicalism
and welfare-statism. Here is a great industry which has been dealt with as
an entity separable from the rest of the economy, in accordance with classic
syndicalist theory. Industrial self-government has been largely the rule, in
both its labor and commercial affairs. True, the Interstate Commerce Commission is supposed to supervise commercial aspects; and the National
Mediation Board, another government agency, is supposed to supervise labor
aspects. But one of the salient facts revealed by Mr. Lecht is that both these
agencies, as well as the myriad other forms of political intervention which
have drifted in and out of the railroad industry's labor and commercial
affairs, have proved powerless in the face of the massive social, political, and
economic forces of the nation (and the world).
The conclusion would have to be that syndicalism in the railroad industry has not produced socially desirable results. From the public's point
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of view, it has produced high rates, poor service, antiquated equipment,
fantastic wastes of manpower, institutionalized featherbedding, and, perhaps most important of all, a creeping tendency to limit the competition
of any other industry which might make the shaky, high-cost, inefficient,
and wasteful railroad industry fall to the ground. From the point of view
of the railroad workers and their unions, their unbending resistance to any
effort on the part of the railroads to economize on labor may have resulted
in the employment of more workers than there otherwise might have been.
The consequences of this approach, however, have been a relative loss in
wages, high railroad rates, and, consequently, quite possibly less railroad
employment than there might have been. From the point of view of the
owners and managers of the railroads, the result has been loss of the right
to run their businesses as they wish, loss of business, as well as loss of profits.
The system has also been a bust politically. The government's encourag~
ment of industry-wide (compulsory) unionism has proved to be a method
of breeding crisis. Every railway dispute now creates a national emergency.
We cannot afford a railway strike.
So, disputes which might have been small and insignificant had we run
railway affairs intelligently now tend to imperil the nation, and they evoke
concessions and compulsions which simply cannot be reconciled with a free
and smoothly functioning economic, social, and political system.
One of the big railway unions will become dissatisfied with the way
things are running. A weak stab at "collective bargaining" between carriers
and union will be made, with no results. The union will then issue a
strike notice. This is usually the signal for the National Mediation Board
to call for an Emergency Board. In the usual case, the Emergency Board's
proposal will be unacceptable. The union will reject it and announce its
intention to strike. The President of the United States may then appoint
more compliant "arbitrators," but if the union will not accept what these
more agreeable men offer, then the President has to "seize" the railroads.
At that point the workers become "employees" of the government. Wages,
and ultimately rates, too, are dictated, and the right to strike is gone.
With every concession to the unions-and the wage boosts are probably
less important than the concessions which aggravate the already institutionalized featherbedding-costs go up. Then rates have to go up. As rates go
up, the competitive position of the railroads worsens. Then efforts have to
be made to keep competitive transport from toppling the rickety framework.
Syndicalist and socialist theory to the contrary notwithstanding, the
economic system is a unitary thing. There is no way to insulate one aspect
of economic activity from all the rest without beggaring everyone in order
to subsidize the favored. Everyone has to pay for the waste encouraged by
the syndicalist experiment in the railroads.
Nothing more favorable can be said of the other great syndicalist device
of the Railway Labor Act, the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The
NRAB, hailed as a great venture in "industrial democracy" or "self-government," is an arbitratjon agency composed of equal numbers of representa-
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tives of the big trade unions and the carrier managements. Its duty is to
resolve "minor" disputes involving interpretation of collective agreements.
NRAB decisions may be appealed to the courts only to enforce decisions
favorable to trade unions. The carriers may not appeal to the courts from
unfavorable decisions. Space considerations preclude a recounting of the
dismal failures of this agency. The reader is referred to Lecht's excellent
account of the matter. (p. 188 et seq.) Suffice it to say here that the NRAB,
too, is another signal syndicalist failure.
II
Laissez-faire might have provided another fruitful analytical framework
for Mr. Lecht's book. Then one might have said that the trouble started
when, in a misapplication of the Sherman Act, the United States Supreme
Court, over powerful dissents, refused to permit the railroad companies to
perfect the cost-saving mergers which they were planning in the early years
of the century.1 In more recent times, as Mr. Lecht points out, such mergers
have been proposed by the government, and only fear of the unions has
prevented their execution. (pp. l02-ll7) For the unions insist that there
must not be any adverse effect on employment. (pp. l02-ll7) However,
since one of the main reasons for the mergers is to economize employment,
obviously they become pointless so long as the government lives in such
deadly fear of the trade unionists.
Again, in the laissez-faire framework, the controls of the Interstate Commerce Commission would be seen, not as devices to keep prices down for
consumers, but-and this is what they have actually turned out to be-as
devices to impose governmental restraints upon competition. The commission simply does not keep down railroad rates. Only competition and wise
capital investment can do that. In limiting competition, the ICC therefore defeats its own raison d'etre. Meanwhile other government interventions make real, forward-looking capital investment impossible: taxes, welfare programs, labor-wasting laws and concessions to the unions-these all
tend to suffocate rather than to encourage dynamic action by the railroads.
Perhaps it was not meant to do so, but Mr. Lecht's book nevertheless
constitutes one of the most potent arguments for laissez-faire that the present
reviewer has read in a long time. Nowhere recently have the contradictions
and absurdities of aimless and politically motivated intervention in the
economic system been made so manifest. Unfortunately, Mr. Lecht himself
offers no systematic reform proposals. Would it be too radical to suggest that
the whole interventionist system has proved its bankruptcy, and that perhaps
it is time to free the railroads of the controls that have been strangling them?
What really would happen if the ICC were abolished, the Railway Labor
Act repealed, and railway labor relations regulated by a strictly enforced
and appropriately amended Taft-Hartley Act? Isn't the burden properly
placed on those who insist upon special treatment of the railroad industry?
l

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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Mr. Lecht does not consciously address himself to these issues. That is
unfortunate, but much is owed him for having made the inquiries which do
nevertheless pose these issues in a striking way.

Sylvester Petro,
Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law

